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Abstract
This paper presents a model of the interactions between a dictator and a mass of citizens
in which the dictator might have an incentive to use hidden repression. Most papers on
political economy of dictatorships assume that the role of repression might work as a signal
about the strength of the regime. Here, under a global games framework, we endogenize
this decision in a situation where there exists a possible threat of an uprising that might
topple the regime. Citizens interact in such a way that the collective action problem of
a revolution is not solved beforehand, and so each one takes the decision to participate
or not in the revolution independently. These decisions are such that there are strategic
complementarities but each citizen is unsure about the actions of her fellow citizens. They
receive two signals about the kind of regime they are facing: one, informing about the
strength of the dictator to withstand a revolution; the second, informing how repressive is the
regime. Given this information, using Bayesian updating, they decide to participate or not.
We show that as long as citizens have perfect information about at least one parameter of the
regime, there exist a unique equilibrium in which regimes which are strong enough have an
incentive to increase the noise informing their repression profile, i.e. to use hidden repression.
We also analyse the robustness of these results by relaxing the quality of information agents
receive. We extend the model to the case where citizens have imperfect information about
both parameters and reach a solution coherent with the previous one.
JEL classification: C72, D82, D84, P48
Keywords: global games, hidden repression, dictatorship
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1 Introduction
“If Stalin had wished to use repression campaigns as a deterrent, he would have openly carried
out such operations under the full glare of a state controlled press. In all of his repression
waves, Stalin chose the course of secrecy, suggesting a concern that such operations would
increase the number of enemies.” - [Gregory et al., 2006, 24]
Repression is known to be a clear tool for the survival of dictatorships. Assassinations, kid-
nappings, imprisonments, torture, exile, limits of liberty of association or on free speech, spying
on civilians and the opposition are usual under dictatorial regimes. All of these activities, con-
ceptualized under the notion of repression, are used to suppress the opposition or to deter the
citizenship or the allies within the regime from subverting. It is no surprise that most of the
literature has taken this view of repression, which tends to model repression either as a signal
about the strength of the government in defeating a possible uprising [Pierskalla, 2010] or an
specific action which is costly but prevents rebellions from ever happening [Acemoglu and Robin-
son, 2006, Gregory et al., 2006]. But if this is the case, and either the visibility of the repression
does not matter or is indeed desired by regimes, why is it that most repressive agencies tend to
be branded as secret police? Instances of this kind of institutions range from disappearances in
the dictatorships in Argentina and Chile through the military, Iran under the Shah through the
SAVAK, Russia’s KGB, Germany’s Gestapo, among many others. One of the clearest examples
is Stalin’s regime, in which arrests were carried out at night if possible, executions made in
remote locations and torture done in after-hours when the normal staff was no longer present.
How do we account, then, for hidden repression? As discussed in the quote above from Gregory
et al. [2006], if Stalin had wished to use repression only as a deterrent, then he would not have
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used secrecy. Thus, the signalling hypothesis seems to prove short in explaining this behaviour
by dictatorial regimes. Choosing the path of hidden repression might be indicative of some costs
of using public and visible repression not usually considered by the literature. This seems to
be a gap in the literature relating to the role of repression under dictatorships, as there is no
systematic study of the role in the visibility of it. This study aims to begin covering that gap,
in order to understand more fully the behaviour of oppressive regimes.
In order to do so, this paper presents a model with two kind of agents: on the one hand, citizens
under a dictatorial regime are represented as a continuum of homogeneous individuals, while
on the other there is a dictator that prefers to be kept in power. This dictatorial regime is
represented by two parameters, one for the force of the regime, and one for the repression of the
regime. Citizens do have imperfect information about the repression that the regime actually
performs, and each receives some private information about it. They need to decide whether to
participate in a revolution or not in a simultaneous game with their fellow citizens, based on the
global games literature. Each citizen needs to take into account not only their private informa-
tion about the regime, but also needs to form beliefs about the beliefs of the rest of citizens in
order to take a course of action. If the number of citizens in the uprising is high enough, it will
overcome the strength of the regime, and the regime is dissolved.
Previous to the subgame in which all citizens take their actions simultaneously, the regime can
affect the dispersion of the private information the agents receive about its repressive activities.
This is, agents do not know exactly how repressive the regime in fact is, but they have certain
beliefs about it, modelled as a private signal informing the level of repression. Lowering the
precision of this signal informing the repressive activities (i.e. increasing the variance of the
distribution) will represent the use of hidden repression by dictatorships in this paper. In Sec-
tion 2 we present the literature review about the role of repression in the political economy of
dictatorships and revolutions. Section 3 presents the model and in the subsections 3.1 to 3.3 we
present the different variations of the model when the citizens have perfect information about
at least one regime’s fundamental parameter. Section 4 presents an important extension of the
model in which citizens do not know the real value of neither fundamental parameter.
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The results show that sufficiently strong regimes might have a strong incentive to lower the pre-
cision of the private information agents have about its repressive conduct. In the context of this
model, the dictator has a strong incentive to use hidden repression or at least to decrease the
visibility of its secret activities. This might be an explanation for the recurrent use of secrecy
and secret agencies as repressive agents.
The intuition behind the result will highlight that citizens considering revolting or not must
consider how repressive they think the regime is, but also the beliefs the rest of the citizens have
about the repression level. Under an uncertainty scenario, given that they know the physical
strength of the regime to withstand a revolution, some people might not trust their private in-
formation enough in order to participate when the regime is strong enough. Decreasing the trust
level citizens deposit in their private perception about the repression might be helpful to strong
regimes. This is what engaging in hidden repression accomplishes.
This model takes seriously the challenge of individual participation by combining it with belief
formation about the behaviour of other potential revolting agents, and so does not assume that
the collective action problem is already solved within the opposition to the regime. The model
predicts that exogenous increases in the precision about the information agents hold, such as the
adoption on new information technologies like the internet, might make some manifestations and
possible toppling of repressive governments more frequent.
2 Literature Review
Repression, following Goldstein [2001], is defined in Davenport [2005] as "the actual or threatened
use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction
of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities
and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions." In
evaluating the sub-field of mobilizations by citizens and repression by regimes, Davenport [2005]
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finds that dynamics between repression and mobilization are not yet very well understood. Some-
times repression dissolves protests, while sometimes it makes people fight harder, while still in
others it seems to depend on the political-economic context. Taxonomical categories of repres-
sion and its studies can be found in Davenport [2007]. The classifications found about repression
include doing it along negative sanctions and restrictions on political liberties or on violations
of personal integrity. Another categorization is given in terms of intensity by Levitsky and Way
[2010], which include in "high-intensity" acts like firing on crowds, arrests or assassination and
"low-intensity", composed of spying opponents, harassing, intimidating, vandalizing or seizing
property. Thus far there does not seem to be a classification or study regarding the visibility
by which repression is implemented. This is so, even though it has been found that an internal
security apparatus is vital in the continuation of dictatorial regimes [Wintrobe, 1998, Levitsky
and Way, 2010, Way, 2008, Skocpol, 1979]. Indeed Svolik [2012] considers that a key factor in
the persistence of a regime is its ability to repress its citizens without the use of the military, but
instead using the police or specialized security agencies. Yet most of these organizations tend to
be of the secret police kind but no systematic work on coercive institutions has been put forward
[Gandhi, 2008]. It seems conceivable that regimes might also use a kind of dissociated-to-the-
regime repression like the use of paramilitary groups working for the regime without an open
connection to it [Tullock, 1987a]. One example of this dynamic is the use of militias in Kaza-
khstan during the Soviet era, in which this group played an important role in deterring planned
demonstrations by intimidating and threatening protest leaders and participants, monitoring and
dispersing demonstrations, and arresting and sometimes interrogating organizers [Shelley, 1995,
p. 183-185]. If this is the case, assessing the actual level of repression of the regime might be
harder for the median citizen.
The literature about the role of repression under dictatorships is extensive, but there are some
basic contentions in most of them. A common one seems to be the idea that dictatorships face
two main problems of governance: the possibility of rebellions and how to obtain cooperation
and enforce contracts [Tullock, 1987a, Gandhi, 2008, Wintrobe, 1990, Svolik, 2012]. Most papers
consider the tool of repression as a mean to make dealing with the opposition less attractive
[Wintrobe, 1990], thereby diminishing the negotiation power of the opposition when discussing
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concessions [Gandhi, 2008]. Although most of the literature usually considers that the relation-
ship between repression and power for dictators is a positive one, an important exception is
Wintrobe [1998]. Wintrobe considers the possibility of a backward bending supply of loyalty
depending on repression, so if the repressive activities of a regime get over a threshold, citizens
will supply less loyalty, as their income effect (through an increase of being subjected to that re-
pression) overcomes the substitution effect normally analysed. This approach is compatible with
the one proposed in this paper. Davenport [2005] shows that the evidence about the relationship
between repression by governments and uprisings and revolutions is not at all clear, as in many
studies it has been shown to be positive, in others negative and in yet others to be irrelevant.
The possibility of the decrease in loyalty given by high levels of repression, as treated here and
in Wintrobe [1998], might explain some of the inconsistencies in the empirical literature about
the effects of repression found in Davenport [2005].
An important empirical work on the study of the variables influencing the actions of dictators
is Gandhi [2008]. Particularly, her research tries to find the variables which lead dictators into
establishing political institutions. In it, Gandhi hypothesizes that a series of variables would
have a predictable impact on the establishing of political institutions (taken as a relinquish of
some power by the autocrat) within dictatorial regimes. Those variables include the availability
of mineral resources, ethnic polarization, income inequality, the presence of neighbouring democ-
racies and repression. Gandhi [2008] finds that the only variable that shows to be statistically
non-significant is the variable repression, measured as the amount of purges during the regime.
We propose here that this unexpected result might not show that repression is irrelevant in as-
sessing the bargaining power of an autocrat, as those findings might imply, but instead that the
visibility type of repression is relevant and needs to be differentiated in order to evaluate the
impact of repression within the survival of a dictatorial regime.
Initially, the theoretical literature about individual citizen participation on revolutions and
regime behaviour, was mostly based on choice theory, either to explain the actions of the regime
[Wintrobe, 1990, Tullock, 1987a], or to explain the actions of the individuals uprising [Olson,
1987, Tullock, 1971, 1974]. This last body of work focused on the collective action problem and
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highlights what has been called the paradox of rebellion. The paradox relates to the difficulty
in explaining individual participation in revolutions given coordination problems and free-rider
effects from the point of view of the citizens living under the regime. If a successful rebellion
is a public good, contribution to it might suffer the usual tragedy of the commons, and so it
seems irrational for agents to participate in said revolutions. Two important surveys on this
are Lichbach [1994] and Kurrild-Klitgaard [2003]. Moore [1995] has proposed instead a game
theoretic perspective for rational models of rebellions.
More recent models have focused on the strategic interactions between dictators and potential
revolutionaries. Pierskalla [2010] uses a dynamic game played between the dictator and the
opposition group and finds the conditions for successful deterrence and protest. He also finds
possible scenarios of escalating violence when incomplete information about the regime’s actions
and a third party are introduced. Under the same method, Ginkel and Smith [1999] model three
agents (government, dissidents and the ‘mob’) in a dynamic setting with incomplete information.
Gregory et al. [2006] describes the optimal behaviour of a dictator in terms of repression, giving
an account for a survival strategy of eliminating large populations of citizens, exemplified with
Stalin. Also, some other works have focused on the conflicts of interest between dictators and the
citizenship at large [Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001, 2006, 2012] and how these interactions might
explain transitions towards democracies. Nonetheless, as highlighted by Svolik [2012], these pa-
pers assume that the collective action problem is already solved and so the game is played only
by two agents: the dictator and one agent representing the public.
Two important papers that do not assume away the collective action problem are Chang et al.
[2013] and Edmond [2011]. Chang et al. [2013] model a revolution as a rent-seeking game in which
the opposition elites might help the repressed public to solve the collective action problem. Still,
the model initially considers a choice-based approach to individual participation, based on mate-
rial incentives provided by the opposition elite, and then it describes a game between the regime
and the opposition elites. In doing so, it does not use a strategic analysis for participation.
Precisely the opposite occurs in Edmond [2011], who uses a global game approach (Morris and
Shin [2002a]) to account for the effect that new technologies on information could have on cor-
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recting for regime’s propaganda about its strength, and how this affects revolution participation
of the agents. This model has the advantage that, through the use of global games, it does not
only account for the beliefs that each citizen has about the strength of the regime, but also for
higher orders beliefs about the rest of the population. Given the strategic complementarity on
revolutions (the more people participate, the higher the probability of a successful revolution),
the study of higher order beliefs is key. Edmond [2011] concludes that if the regime has access to
information manipulation about the signal informing its strength, then sometimes improvements
on the quality of information might make the regime more likely to survive. This is due to the
fact that citizens cannot infer correctly that amount of manipulation on the information.
Given that Edmond [2011] focuses on the role of propaganda about the strength of the regime,
it also leaves aside the role of repression as such in the continuation of a dictatorial regime. In
accordance with Gregory et al. [2006], it is my contention that direct repression, and not only
‘probable’ repression (as is the case with the beliefs about the strength of the regime to withstand
a revolution), should be a central element in these studies. But, as mentioned, repression can be
both public and hidden. Evidently, public repression might work both as a useful tool to sup-
press insurgents and as a signal about the strength of the regime, as modelled in Gregory et al.
[2006], but it can also have an opposite effect in decreasing the opportunity cost associated with
revolting, as citizens find it more probable being themselves victims of the regime. It also seems
possible that in latest decades more contemporary regimes have seen value in hidden repression
as a way to repress without being subjected to external pressure, such as economic sanctions by
multilateral organizations. Can we account both for the use of public and private repression and
the collective action problem? Does the visibility of the repression actually affects the probability
of an uprising by the citizens? Are there particular kinds of regimes that one would expect to
engage in more public or more hidden repression?
In order to develop a model that answers these questions this paper relies heavily on the litera-
ture on global games initiated by Carlsson and Van Damme [1993] and Morris and Shin [1998,
2002a,b]. This framework is quite helpful when analysing situations such as possible revolts
because of a number of reasons: first, it allows to model each agent as taking an independent
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decision in a binary action (revolt or not revolt) when there are strategic complementarities;
second, the change of regime depends on a ’fundamental’ parameter, such as the strength of
the regime or its level of repression; third, it allows to reach a prediction (unique equilibrium)
through the use of modelling agents information as imperfect regarding the fundamentals of the
game, which is arguably a strategy that maps closer to reality the kind of information agents
actually have.
The global games approach began modelling simultaneous games with disturbances on the in-
formation of agents. The priors of the agents were described through improper distribution
functions, usually supported over R, and ergo the "global" which describes the possibility of any
kind of previous beliefs. When heterogeneous information is added, even when it is arbitrar-
ily small, a unique equilibrium is reached. Even though some sequential applications of global
games with rational expectations have contended the uniqueness conclusions [Angeletos et al.,
2006, 2007], others like Edmond [2011] have reached uniqueness even in sequential frameworks.
Another important paper that uses this methodology related to the political economy of dictator-
ships is Persson and Tabellini [2009]. In it the authors study how democratic capital, measured
by nation’s experience with democracy, affects the transitions between autocracies and democ-
racies. The latter paper models a global game in which individual citizens decide whether to
defend democracy or not, and this decision is affected by the democratic capital of the country. I
use here an approach similar to Morris and Shin [2002b], where the main model is the one played
by the continuum of agents, and the optimal decision of a central authority can be more easily
studied just by analysing the equilibrium results of the global game.
3 Model
There is a continuum of agents representing the mass of citizens under the regime, indexed by
i ∈ [0, 1], where each agent has the possibility to revolt or not:
ai =

0 if not revolt
1 if revolt
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The mass of agents revolting is
A =
1∫
0
aidi ∈ [0, 1]
Parameter θ ∈ R is exogenous and represents the strength of the regime to withstand an attack.
This strength might well include the support by some portion of the population loyal to the
regime. On the other hand, η ∈ R represents what would be defined as the normalized repression
profile of the regime with respect to a political system where the regime is overthrown. A positive
η is to be interpreted as a repressive regime, and the higher the value, the more repressive it is. η
lower than zero represents dictatorships that infringe on liberty and freedom less than whatever
real alternative there is for organizing the political system. The payoff for not revolting is
normalized to zero. The payoffs are such that participation is rewarded if the regime falls. b > 0
represents the gains other than those of freedom from repression from the fall of the regime, such
as improved economic standards, while precisely η represents the gains in utility from being freed
from the repression under which the regime subjects its citizens. The cost of revolting is c > 0.
The regime falls if the aggregated attack is big enough. Thus, the utility function of the citizens
is characterized by:
ui(ai, A, θ, η) = ai([b+ η]R− c)
where R is a binary indicator, so R = 1 if and only if A > θ and R = 0 otherwise.
There are strategic complementarities, and so the more citizens participate in the revolution, the
more likely the revolution will succeed, and so the more likely that the best response for a citizen
is also to revolt. This can be seen if the utility function of the agent is rewritten as:
ui = U(ai, A, θ, η) =

ai(b+ η − c) if A > θ
−aic if A ≤ θ
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Assuming A and θ are known, and as long as b+ η > c, we have that the best response g(A, θ) is
g(A, θ) =

1 if A > θ
0 if A ≤ θ
After the type of regime (θ, η) is chosen by nature, we consider both cases in which at least one
of the parameters is perfectly known and citizens have imperfect information about the other.
Agents will receive either an idiosyncratic signal xi = θ+ i or γi = η+ zi informing the strength
and the repression profile, respectively. The noises i and zi will be independent of θ and η and
IID normally distributed with mean zero and variance α−1 and β−1, respectively. Precision β
represents the homogeneity of the beliefs of the public with respect to the real repression the
regime imposes as a whole. Following, I will consider the ‘complete uncertainty’ case, where both
parameters are unknown to each agent.
Let us define ∆β as the change in β from an initial value β0 to a final β1, such that ∆β = β1−β0.
The regime then uses ∆β as control variable, which represents the changes in the precision of
the signal informing the repressive profile of the regime. After the regime realizes its type (θ, η)
and before the respective signals about its type are received by the citizens, the regime takes an
action ∆β s.t. ∆β ∈ [−β0,∞), where β ≡ 1σ2γ represents the precision of the signal received by
the citizens regarding the repression profile of the regime. Increasing (signalling) or decreasing
(using hidden repression)the precision of the signal γ, either to make it more precise or to make
it less precise, will be costly. In both cases, the regime needs to spend resources either making
more visible its repression profile, or trying to hide it from the public through the use of secret
repression. The cost function C(∆β) will be convex , with C(0) = 0, C ′(∆β) < 0 if ∆β < 0,
C ′(∆β) > 0 if ∆β > 0 and C ′′(β) ≥ 0. We assume the dictator prefers to be kept in power as it
allows himself and the people close to him to extract rents from the rest of the citizens. If θ < A,
the regime is thrown out of power and gets an outside option normalized to zero. If it stays in
power, it receives a payment normalized to one. The utility function of the regime then is
11
uR(A(η, β, θ), θ) =

1 if θ ≥ A
0 if θ < A
The fact that the control variable for the regime is the variance and not η directly can be in-
terpreted as a case where the regime is bounded to exert an exogenous level of repression given
some external political or economical factors. It can also be interpreted as a case in which the
regime has a certain preference for repressing a particular group within its society in a certain
way. An example of the latter would be the case of most repressive theocracies against minority
religious groups.
As said previously, the action of the regime is not visible by the citizens, because they do not
know what the normal signal’s precision is (they do not know β before action ∆β). We want to
analyse under which conditions it is profitable for the regime to use hidden repression, which is
identified in this model as decreasing the precision of the signal γ informing its repression profile
η, which means ∆β < 0.
The solution concept is a symmetric Perfect Bayesian equilibrium defined by:
Definition 1. An equilibrium is a citizen strategy a(·), an aggregate attack A(·) and dictator
strategy ∆β(·) such that:
a(x, γ) ∈ arg max
a
E[U(a,A(θ, η), θ, η) | x, γ]
∆β(θ, η, β) ∈ arg max
∆β
E[UR() | θ, η]
A(θ, η) =
∫ ∫
a(x, γ)fx(x | θ)fγ(γ | η)dxdγ
Finally, Figure 0 summarizes the time structure of the model:
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Figure 0: The timing of the model
3.1 Common Knowledge
Let us assume that θ and η are known by the citizens. In this case any action ∆β 6= 0 is pointless,
and so it will be zero. Consider the strength of the regime such that if θ ≤ 0. The regime will be
so weak that any mass of agents will depose the regime, and so ai = 1 is the dominant strategy
for all citizens. On the contrary, if θ > 1, the regime will be so strong that even if all agents
revolt, there will be no overthrown, and so ai = 0 is the dominant strategy for all citizens. If
θ ∈ (0, 1], there are multiple self-fulfilling equilibria.
3.2 Known repression profile
In this case there is knowledge about the repression profile of the regime, but there is uncertainty
about the strength of the regime. Each citizen has a common prior over θ in the form of an im-
proper uniform distribution over the real line. Then each citizen gets a noise signal about the
regime strength xi = θ+i and i ∼ N (0, α−1). Carlsson and Van Damme [1993] and Morris and
Shin [2002a] discuss how in this kind of models, given some uncertainty about the fundamentals,
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there exists the possibility of reaching a unique equilibrium.
In fact, following an equilibrium given in the form of threshold rules, there exist a unique type
of regime strength θ∗ such that the regime is overthrown for θ < θ∗ and a unique signal (or
threshold) x∗ such that a citizen participates in the revolution for x < x∗.
Proposition 1. When the repression profile of the regime is known while the strength is not,
the unique equilibrium threshold (x∗, θ∗) for the sub-game is given by
x∗ = θ∗ +
1√
α
Φ−1(θ∗)
θ∗ = 1− c
b+ η
where Φ(·) is the normal standard c.d.f. and Φ−1 its inverse.
Proof. See Appendix A.2
This is a particular instance of the result reached by Morris and Shin [1998].This model satisfies
the conditions for the existence of a unique equilibrium exposed in Morris and Shin [2002a]. As
mentioned before, an important branch of the global games literature inspired by Morris and
Shin [2002b] has used models where there are two types of information about θ, public and
private, and the conditions for uniqueness imply that private information needs to be sufficiently
precise with respect to the public one. In our case this is indeed so because not having public
information implies private information is infinitely more precise for any finite value of α. Notice
also that in this equilibrium the minimum strength required for the regime to survive does not
depend on the precision of the signal xi. As a first examination of how the model so far complies
to intuition for modelling repressive regimes, we can compute the comparative statics of how an
increase in the repression profile affects the a priori probability of survival of the regime
∂θ∗
∂η
= c(b+ η)−2 > 0 (1)
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This implies that the a priori strength necessary for the regime to survive an uprising is higher
as the repression profile increases. This is an expected result given the fact that an increment
in the repression profile can be seen as a decrease in the opportunity cost of participating in the
revolution for the marginal agent, as there is more to gain from the overthrown of the regime.
This basic result seems plausible: the more repressive a regime is, the more people can see their
participation in a revolution as less costly, as they might have less to loose (as family members
or friends might have been subjected to the regime’s oppression). It can also be seen as related
to the probability that each citizen assigns to be repressed herself in the future.
Consider now the values of η for which the regime can never survive and also the values for which
it always does. These results are the basis of the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. a) If the repression profile of a regime is known, a sufficiently strong regime can
perform any amount of repression and still survive. b) A regime either (i) not repressive enough
or (ii) where costs of participating in the revolution are high enough, can always survive, inde-
pendently of its strength. This is, a) lim
η→∞ θ
∗ = 1−; b) θ∗ = 0 implies b+ η ≤ c.
The proof is clear by inspection.
This result leads to a similar conclusion as in Tullock [1974] and Tullock [1987b]. Similar to
these works, we have that in order to avoid free riding problems, costs of participation cannot
be to high. In this case, this can be seen in the previous result, as one sufficient condition for
the regime to not need any relevant strength (θ = 0) is that the costs of participation are higher
than the possible benefits from toppling the regime.
3.3 Known regime strength, unknown repression
Let us analyse now what happens when citizens know the strength of the regime but can only
observe the repression profile imperfectly through a noisy signal. This represents the core model
in this document. Consider then the case where each agent receives a signal γi = η + zi
where zi ∼ N (0, β−1). The normalized density of γ given η is φ(
√
β(γ − η)) and so A =
15
∞∫
−∞
a(θ, γi)
√
βφ(
√
β(γ − η))dγ.
Consider again a monotonic equilibrium, so a(θ, γi) is monotonic in γi. The threshold γ∗ is such
that agents attack if and only if γi ≥ γ∗. Contrary to the previous section, the signal in this case
should be greater than the threshold given the interpretation of η already discussed. γ∗ can be
considered as the lowest value about the belief that each agent has about the repression profile
in order for her to participate in the revolution. We have then
A = 1− Φ(
√
β(γ∗ − η))
This implies that the aggregate size of the attack is increasing in η, so that there is a threshold η∗
such that the regime is overthrown if and only if η ≥ η∗, where η∗ solves the following condition:
A(η∗) = θ. This, in turn, implies that
γ∗ = η∗ +
Φ−1(1− θ)√
β
(2)
It should be noted that η∗ is the maximum value of the repression profile the regime could have
in order to survive. Characterizing now the equilibrium γ∗ for a given η∗ gives us the second
condition for the whole equilibrium, which is based on an indifference analysis for the marginal
agent. Given that the regime changes if and only if η ≥ η∗, we have that the probability of
change of regime is
Pr[η ≥ η∗ | γ] = 1− Φ(
√
β(η∗ − γ)) = Φ(
√
β(γ − η∗))
Given that the posterior for each agent about η is γi, it in turn implies that
(b+ Ei[η])Pr[η ≥ η∗ | γi] = (b+ γi)Φ(
√
β(γ∗ − η∗)) = c (3)
Finally, using conditions 2 and 3 we have
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Figure 1: maximum repression η∗ for different types of regime strength θ in equilibrium
1− θ = c
b+ γi
(4)
⇔ γi = c
1− θ − b (5)
Condition 5 represents here the unique value for all marginal agents of γi for which the agent
would be indifferent between revolting and not revolting. This particular value then also repre-
sents the switching strategy that we were looking for. This result is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. When the strength of the regime is known while the repression profile is not,
the unique equilibrium threshold γ∗ and η∗ is given by
γ∗ =
c
1− θ − b
η∗ =
c
1− θ − b−
Φ−1(1− θ)√
β
Figure 1 runs a numerical simulation of Proposition 2 in which the values b and c are normalized
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to 1. It shows the mapping of η∗ for different values of θ. It also assumes that the natural
tendency for private information regarding the repression profile of the regime, is such that the
standard deviation of the signal is 1, ergo β0 is also 1. The blue line in Figure 1, representing η∗,
shows a consistent result with Lemma 1, in so far we can see that a regime strong enough can
afford to repress its citizens as much as it needs to without being overthrown. This is so, even
though here we reached the same conclusion now introducing the imperfection on information
on the repression profile of the regime. Notice that the blue line expressing η∗ will always have
a section below the green one (c/(1− θ)− b) for all values of c, b and β, which is evident by the
limits of those functions. Also, observe that if β were to increase, the red line would get closer
to being mostly ’horizontal’, while decreasing it would make it more ’vertical’.
In terms of the equilibrium, it is important that even though the disturbances in terms of the
information here are applied directly into the utility functions, much like in the classical paper
of Carlsson and Van Damme [1993], the uniqueness of the equilibrium withstands. Now, the
analysis of the comparative statics of this equilibrium will lead us to the first main result of this
document.
Proposition 3. When the strength of the regime is known while the repression profile is not,
weak regimes (θ < 1/2) have an incentive to increase the precision of signal γ while strong
regimes (θ > 1/2) have an incentive to decrease it. This is, if the regime does not know how
much repression it will need to use eventually, weak regimes will tend to resort less to hidden
repression, while strong regimes will tend to use it more. Furthermore, weak regimes have an
upper limit c/(1 − θ) − b on the amount of repression they can inflict. This value is also the
minimum of the maximal repression a strong regime can inflict.
Proof. Recall that the interpretation of η∗ is the maximum amount of repression a regime could
impose in order to survive, given its strength. Imagine a regime that knows its strength type,
but not its repression profile yet. If it can modify the value of β before knowing η, that regimes
would like to have as much leeway as possible in terms of repression without jeopardizing their
possible continuity in power, and so they would like to have the highest possible value of η∗ in
order to increase the probability of survival. With this in mind, consider the derivative of η∗
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Figure 2: maximum repression η∗ vs precision in η for different values θ
with respect to β:
∂η∗
∂β
=
1
2
Φ−1(1− θ)β− 32 (6)
It is clear that equation 6 is negative for θ > 1/2 and positive for θ < 1/2. For the second part
of the proposition it is sufficient to note that for all β, β′ ∈ R++
[
c
1− θ − b−
Φ−1(1− θ)√
β
| θ > 1
2
]
≥ c
1− θ − b ≥
[
c
1− θ − b−
Φ−1(1− θ)√
β′
| θ < 1
2
]
Figure 2 illustrates this result, as it shows the values of η∗ for different types of regime strength,
when β is modified. Proposition 2 is driven by the following mechanism. If the regime is weak,
the maximum repression it can inflict is bounded and so low, that it would prefer the citizens
to know exactly how lowly repressive the regime is, so that they would not value revolting suf-
ficiently high, and by implication, each citizen does not think her fellow citizens would consider
the benefits from revolting that high. Strong regimes, on the other hand, have a higher capacity
for repression, and so they would like citizens to distrust as much as possible their perception
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of repression, so they are not very sure about what the perception of their fellow citizens are.
Through this channel, participation in the revolution declines, and so the amount of repression
it could inflict increases.
This condition, however, is necessary but not sufficient for a regime that does know its precise
type (θ, η) to use hidden repression (or public repression). Once the regime knows its type η, it
will know if it will survive or not given the current precision of the signal γ. In case it survives
(η∗ ≥ η), then the optimal decision for the regime is ∆β = 0, given that distorting β is costly.
In the opposite case, it will like to distort it only up to the point where it barely survives. That
is, its optimal β∗ solves the following indifference condition:
η =
c
1− θ − b−
Φ−1(1− θ)√
β∗√
β∗ = − Φ
−1(1− θ)
η − c1−θ + b
(7)
Remember that β is the inverse of a variance, so
√
β should be positive, as it is the inverse of
the standard deviation of γ. So, at the end, the rational variation of β, which is the solution to
the regime problem, is given by
∆β∗ =

[
Φ−1(1− θ)
η − c1−θ + b
]2
− β if η > η∗(β)
0 if η ≤ η∗(β)
(8)
subject to− Φ
−1(1− θ)
η − c1−θ + b
> 0
Proposition 4. After knowing precisely its type (θ, η), in case the regime cannot survive at the
initial value β, the regime would like to increase β if it is of a weak type, and decrease it if it
is of a strong type. This means weak regimes would like to use public repression, while strong
regimes would opt for hidden repression. Moreover, if the costs of altering the precision β are
low enough, every regime with a strength θ > 1/2 can survive a possible revolution.
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Proof. Consider regimes of type θ < 1/2 which would not survive at the current β, so
η >
c
1− θ − b−
Φ−1(1− θ)√
β
(9)
The regime then aims at the value η∗(β∗) such that β∗ solves the indifference condition
η =
c
1− θ − b−
Φ−1(1− θ)√
β∗
(10)
Combining 9 and 10, we have that
Φ−1(1− θ)√
β∗
<
Φ−1(1− θ)√
β
β < β∗
(∆β)∗ > 0
Similarly, for θ > 1/2 we will obtain that ∆β < 0. This action will be taken by the regime if and
only if
C(∆β) < 11
Consider an increasing function C(∆β) as defined at the beginning, with C ′′(·) > 02 sufficiently
close to 0. Then, for all (∆β)∗ 6= 0, C(∆β) < 1.
1Notice that we can easily consider a possible extension of this model with this proposition. If Svolik [2012] is
right, then regimes care about how many people would revolt, as that fact would influence the role of the military
and the future possibility of an internal coup. It could then be assumed that the size of the revolution might affect
the possible rents extracted by the regime, even if it can quell the uprising. Consider the possible changes in the
results of this proposition if we were to change the utility function of the regime so it cares about the difference
by which it can suppress the revolution. So the utility of the regime would be UR = θ − A if θ ≥ A (in case it
survives) and UR = 0 if θ < A (if it does not survive). Then, the result would hold if and only if C(∆β) < θ−A.
As is plainly visible, this proposition would still hold for sufficiently low costs of the optimal regime’s action ∆β.
2Note that this condition about the second derivative of function C(·) generates changes in the kind of regimes
that do not take action because of the high costs of the necessary action to survive in the following way. The
closer θ is to 0.5 with θ > 0.5, the greater the change needed in β in order for the regime to survive. Also, the
higher η, the greater the change needed in β for the regime to survive. Thus, for a positive value of the function
C(·) we will find that the blue shaded area is reduced from the left, with the left edge of the blue area taking a
parabola shape. This can be seen more clearly Figure 6 in the Appendix.
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Figure 3: Optimal ∆β for different regime types
Figure 3 and Figure 6 (in Appendix A) illustrate the optimal values for β∗ if the action ∆β were
sufficiently cheap for an initial β = 1 3. In Figure 3, we only differentiate between increasing
or decreasing β while on Figure 6 the concrete values of β∗ up to 10 are shown. This means
the blue area on Figure 3 shows the type of regimes that would use hidden repression, while the
ones in red are the ones who would like to increase the precision of signal β. The gains in the
possibility of safe repression (repression that would not represent a threat) through the use of
changes in visibility modelled by precision β, are quite substantial. This can easily be seen by
comparing the blue line in Figure 1, which represents the maximum safe-repression, versus all
the shaded areas of Figure 3. Two new sets of regimes types now survive versus the one that
did in Proposition 2. The most interesting case being the blue set in Figure 3, which represents
the set of regime types that now can survive while being, in general, much more repressive than
before. This difference is granted only by changing the visibility or precision with which citizens
perceive how repressive those regimes are.
3We note that this action is the optimal one given a sufficiently low cost function C(·). Notice that assuming
this is innocuous to our results, given that the regime will only take the action if the costs of taking the action
does not surpass the gain in utility of taking said action: C(∆β∗) ≤ 1. As can bee seen in Figure 6 the optimal
action of the regime takes a value closest to −1 as the regime has a strength closer to the threshold value θ = 0.5
and as it increases in its repressive profile η. Thus, considering an action cost higher that 1 would only take a left
part of the blue shaded area in Figure 3 into no action (white colour).
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Proposition 4 is very important, as it shows that every regime that is slightly stronger that 1/2
can now be much more repressive, if it uses enough hidden repression in order to hide its real
repression profile. That means that a regime does not need to be extremely strong, as shown in
Lemma 1 (where the needed value θ for the regime to survive while being extremely repressive -
with a high η - tended to θ = 1), in order to be extremely repressive and survive. It only needs
to be strong enough and use hidden repression. This is the main result of this document.
The intuition behind this result steams from the fact that citizens, knowing the strength of the
regime, need to consider the beliefs their neighbours have about the repression level. If their
trust for their private information is sufficiently low, they also will have less confidence about
what their fellow citizens belief. Thus, if the regime is sufficiently strong, each individual might
risk too much by revolting and many will withhold from it. The regime knows this, and thus
decreases the precision of the signal, engaging in hidden repression. If the regime is sufficiently
strong, there exist a modification of the signal that allows any amount of repression to be carried
out safely. On the other hand, weak regimes dislike uncertainty because being weak, they cannot
be too repressive without being overthrown. Therefore, these kind of regimes would like to signal
with higher precision how lowly repressive they are.
3.4 An Illustration
We need to keep in mind that the predictions given by this model, clearly seen in Figure 3, imply
that: 1) weak regimes that are highly repressive will be disposed off no matter how much hidden
repression they use (upper-left white area); 2)some moderately lowly repressive and weak regimes
will not use hidden repression (read area); 3) regimes that can support their repression (without
engaging in hidden repression) based on their physical strength will do so and survive (white
inferior area below the red and blue areas); 4) regimes that are strong enough and sufficiently
repressive will engage in hidden repression. For two equally repressive regimes, the weaker one
(never beyond a certain threshold - in this case θ = 1/2), will need to use a higher degree of
hidden repression (See Appendix A).
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A point in case might suffice for now to illustrate prediction 4. Consider the Soviet Union, af-
ter the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. Given that the revolutionaries have ousted the imperial
regime, it seems safe to assume that the USSR was above the strength threshold considered in
the model. Thus, we need to compare the actions of the regime in terms of its purges, which
were carried out mainly through secrecy, and its strength. Lets proxy the strength of the regime
by its economic growth per worker, as this increase in income would allow the regime to buy
more weapons and pay to more soldiers 4. As Fischer [1994] has shown, the Soviet economy was
shrinking from the period of 1913 and 1921, mainly because of World War I, the revolution itself
and the Civil War. This same period of time encapsulated the first of the big purges in the Soviet
Russia, which Gregory et al. [2006] estimates around 250,000 non-battlefield victims. The next
purge occurs during 1930 in the process known as the ’Dekulakization’ which had around 60,000
victims, carried know under Stalin instead of Lenin. During this period of time Easterly and
Fischer [1995] estimate that economic growth per worker was around 3.0 %. The biggest purge
was carried out during the so called ’mass operation’ occurred between 1937 and 1938, which is
estimated to murdered around 672,371 people. Economic growth then slowed down during the
next decade to 1.9 %. The same decade saw a relative decrease in the size of the purges within
the regime, with the ’National operations’ taking 343,371 victims in the period between 1937
and 1945. Lastly, lets consider that the big purges ended in the next decade of the 1950s, where
economic growth per worker reached its peak of 5.8 %.
If we assume that the real amount of repression was roughly the same during the period of 1917
and 1960 5, we can see with this broad data that there seems to be an inverse relationship be-
tween the strength of the regime and its amount of hidden repression. This is exactly prediction
4 for sufficiently strong regimes.
4Taking economic growth as a proxy for the strength of the regime certainly might give rise to possible reverse
causation, as increasing the amount of hidden repression might decrease the perspectives of the economy. I do
not deal with this problem here, as I just want to illustrate that at least a correlation exists. Nonetheless, further
empirical research would definitively need to deal with this concern.
5Of course, we would need a much more detailed account of the regime’s actions during this time. For example,
even though Lenin readmitted some market oriented policies with his ’New Economic Policy’ of 1921, it was later
abolished by Stalin in 1928.
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An alternative, even though maybe less precise, way to assess the amount of hidden repression is
to consider the weight that the secret police had in the USSR during the same period. The secret
police during the Lenin period, the Cheka (the Russian acronym for the All-Russian Extraordi-
nary Commission for the Suppression of Counterrevolution and Sabotage) transformed in 1922
to the OGPU (United State Political Administration) and then to the more powerful NKVD in
1934. Later in 1943, the NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) would reduce its
power and be splat between the NKVD and the NKGB. The power of the KGB, although with
functions similar to those of the ones under Lenin and Stalin, employed terror to a much lesser
degree and carried far less operations [Encyclopedia, 2012]. Thus, if we compare the amount of
hidden repression during the Lenin-Stalin era by the importance of the secret police to the one
after that, we could see that secret repression was much more common in the first period than
in the second. This is consistent with the model put forward before.
We will now consider some possible extensions of the model in order to evaluate the robustness
of the previous results.
4 Uncertainty about both repression and strength
Let us now relax the assumption that agents have perfect information about at least one param-
eter and consider the case in which there exist noise in the signals informing both parameters.
That is, let us consider now the most extreme scenario, when neither parameter is known and
instead citizens receive signals xi = θ + i and γi = η + zi, where θ and η are independent
variables and have the same improper prior defined over R. Also, consider that both i and zi
are distributed normally, with mean 0, and variance α−1 and β−1 respectively.
Recall than in the previous versions of this model, the Bayesian equilibrium in the sub-game
when citizens take their action was, a duple of thresholds (x∗, θ∗) or (γ∗, η∗). In the first case,
the threshold described the values such that agents would revolt if and only if they receive a
signal xi ≤ x∗, while in the second case they revolted if and only if agents received a signal
γi ≥ γ∗. Notice the difference in direction in the inequality. Now, this last inequality implies as
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well that agents revolt if and only if −γi ≤ −γ∗.
According to this last paragraph then, it seems reasonable to assume that the way in which
agents take into account their information about the regime is as is now described. Let us define
a function that fuses both signals h(xi, γ) = hi where h : R×R→ R. Define as well a subsequent
strategy rule defined by a threshold on h. Define the same function type for a value ζ(θ, η) = ζ,
now defined over the parameters θ, η, where ζ : R × R → R. Functions h(·) and ζ(·) are such
that their derivatives with respect to x and θ are positive, while their derivatives with respect to
γ and η are negative. h and ζ should also be continuous and smooth on both parameters. The
threshold is such that agents attack if and only if hi ≤ h∗.
Given the complexity of the computations needed to solve this model, let us consider a linear
type of function for h and ζ, such that hi(xi, γi) = xi − γi and ζ(θ, η) = θ − η. In this case we
can use the properties for the sum of normally distributed independent random variables xi and
γi, given θ and η. As shown in Grinstead and Snell [1997], we can use the theorem that proves
that the distribution of h conditional on (θ, η) is a normal N (θ−η, α−1 +β−1). Normalizing the
distribution, this implies that σh(h− ζ) ∼ N (0, 1), where σh = (α−1 + β−1)− 12 .
Let us now use an algorithm similar to the ones used previously to solve this equilibrium. Given
threshold h∗, the amount of agents that will receive a combined signal hi lower than h∗ conditional
on ζ, will give the aggregate attack
A = Φ((α−1 + β−1)−
1
2 (h∗ − ζ)) (11)
Note that A(·) decreases in ζ, so the regime change occurs if and only if ζ ≤ ζ∗, where ζ∗ =
θ∗(η)− η is the solution to
A(·) =Φ((α−1 + β−1)− 12 (h∗ − ζ∗)) = θ∗(η)
=Φ((α−1 + β−1)−
1
2 (h∗ − θ∗(η) + η)) = θ∗(η)
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So,
h∗ = θ∗(η)− η + Φ−1(θ∗(η))(α−1 + β−1) 12 (12)
Given that the regime is overthrown if and only if ζ ≤ ζ∗, h∗ solves the indifference condition in
the expected payoff of the marginal agent
E[b+ η]Pr[ζ ≤ ζ∗] = c (13)
As we have that the agent expects ζ to be hi and by Bayes’ rule, they expect η to be γi, then
Pr[ζ ≤ ζ∗] = 1− Φ((α−1 + β−1)− 12 (h∗ − ζ∗)) (14)
Replacing (14) in (13), and taking expected values, we have
(b+ γi)(1− θ∗(γi)) = c
θ∗(γi) = 1− c
b+ γi
(15)
Where θ∗(γi) represents the belief each citizen has about the minimal strength the regime needs
to survive given strategy h∗ given its belief about the repression profile of the regime. Quite
uniquely to this extension compared to the previous ones, now we have that each citizen esti-
mates a different threshold for θ, so under this difference of beliefs it is obvious that most (all,
except one at most) citizens will have a mistaken expectations about the real strength that the
regime needs in order to survive. The real threshold value on the strength of the regime will
actually be given by the mass of agents which receive a pair of signals xi and γi such that the
participation condition is fulfilled, as it will shortly be shown.
There are very interesting features from this model. First, even though citizens update their
expectations based on a Bayesian algorithm and that we imposed a solution to obtain the most
accurate expectations, most citizens are indeed quite mistaken in their expectations of θ(η).
These mistakes occur even though they are quite rational. This result resembles in a way some
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herd models, such as Becker [1991], in which there might arise a herd in which agents take reach
a non-Paretian result through what might seem as an irrational action, but is actually not given
their beliefs. Thus, in our model, the action rule is based on the best information the citizens
have about both the real parameters of the regime and the information their fellow citizens might
also have. In line with the rational expectations literature, these mistakes on the part of the cit-
izens do occur, but in the aggregate they do in no systematic way. Additionally, a priori citizens
have no way to improve the accuracy of their participation rule, as their best guess about the
real value of η will be γi.
Now, in order to analyse this condition it is important to note that this value cannot be computed
analytically. Thus, we proceed to run a Monte Carlo simulation for a set of parameters (θ, η).
For each of these pairs we compute a simulation of the signals received by each agent based on
the normal distribution of both xi = θ + i and γi = η + zi. We proceed then to compute the
participation decision of each agent based on the strategy rule defined over the threshold 6
h∗(γi) = 1− c
b+ γi
− γi + Φ−1
(
1− c
b+ γi
)
(α−1 + β−1)
1
2
which is equivalent to participating in the revolution if
xi ≤ 1− c
b+ γi
+ Φ−1
(
1− c
b+ γi
)
(α−1 + β−1)
1
2 (16)
There are two distinct effects from a change of β that can be observed on the participation
condition (16). The first and most obvious relates to (α−1 + β−1)1/2, which explicitly includes
variable β. Consider the following limits of this part of the equation:
lim
β→∞
(α−1 + β−1)1/2 = α−1/2 and lim
β→0
(α−1 + β−1)1/2 =∞
Through this channel, we have that increasing β (increasing the visibility of the repression) would
decrease the probability of participation in the revolution, as the right hand side of (16) is lower
than it would be if β were to decrease. If this were the only effect of changing β, this would
6The Matlab code used for the simulations is available on request.
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mean that every regime would like to increase it, and thus not use hidden repression but more
public repression. But there is another, more indirect, effect of increasing β. Consider the value
of θ∗ given by (15). Notice that this value is such that as γi tends either to −∞ or +∞, its value
tends to 1. This is precisely what is happening as β increases, as more and more values of the
distribution of γi are further from the mean η. Thus, more people will receive an extreme signal
that imply that for those agents θ∗i will take a value close to 1. This, in turn, implies that
lim
γi→±∞
Φ−1
(
1− c
b+ γi
)
=∞
We know that the regime would like make the right hand side value of (16) as small as possible,
so that it would reduce the probability of participation in the revolution. This would mean that
it would like to decrease the median value of Φ−1(θ∗i ), which implies not sending extreme signals
γi the citizens. Hence, we have an opposite effect of a change in β on (16). The exact weight of
each force needs to be computed numerically. This is what we do next.
We compute a series of simulations for each duple of parameters within the ranges: 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1
and −4 ≤ η ≤ 20. For each (θ, η) we create a normal distribution for each signal xi and γi with
xi ∼ N (θ, α−1) and γi ∼ N (η, β−1). The simulation is run using normalized values for b = 1,
c = 1 and β0 = 1.
Figure 4.a shows the values of the size of the revolution A, where colours closer to red represent
a higher mass of participants, while colours closer to dark blue represent lower values. Figure 4.b
represents a mapping of the kind of regimes that do survive the revolution given their parameters
and the given citizens’ participation rule. As can be seen, the form of this numerical simulation
resembles very closely the threshold computed for the equilibrium in Section 3. Lastly, Figure
5 maps which kind of regimes would have an incentive to decrease β, i.e. which regimes have
an incentive to use hidden repression. Figure 5 evidences that most regimes sufficiently strong
(θ > 0.5), that did not survive at the given noise level on the signal informing the repression
profile (γ), now do survive.
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((a)) Aggregated attack ((b)) Regime Survival
White: survives; Black: Does not
Figure 4: Simulation Results
Figure 5: Green Area: Regimes that would use hidden repression
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Remarkably, this is pretty much in line with the results of Section 3.3, particularly with the
results shown in Proposition 4 and Figure 3. In both cases the optimal action of the regime is
to use hidden repression (decrease β0) when its repression profile by itself would not grant its
survival. This finding is quite clean given the fact that the results were not reached analytically.
Thus, we have the main result of this extension of the model, that is, we have shown that the
results found in Section 3.3 are robust in the sense that roughly the same prediction withstands:
it would be expected that regimes engage in hidden repression whenever they need
to be quite repressive and they are sufficiently strong. Hence, we would not expect weak
regimes to engage in much hidden repression (actually they would not take any action to modify
β).
These results then suggest that the effect of dispersing the signals received by agents about the
repression profile (as an decrease in β does) more than compensates for the increase in the value
of the correction taken by the citizens in order to internalize said imprecision.
5 Conclusions
There seems to be a gap in the literature, both theoretical and empirical, about the role of hid-
den repression and secret agencies in the survival of dictatorial regimes. This paper has tried to
begin filling that gap by showing a model in which strong and repressive dictatorial regimes have
a strong incentive to decrease the visibility of said repression. We have modelled this decrease
in visibility as an increase in the variance with which citizens perceive the amount of repression
the whole society is subject to. The reason for this tendency is that not hiding how repressive
the regime is, might affect not only the individual calculation of the agent, but also her higher
order beliefs about the participation on a revolt by other citizens.
This is a very interesting opportunity to explore the links between the secrecy of repressive ac-
tivities, the collective action problem of revolutions and the higher order beliefs of each citizen
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7. These results highlight that a distinction must be made then, between visible and non-visible
repression. Evidently, the empirical studies of hidden repression have to be made only retrospec-
tively, when the hidden part of those repressive activities has come out to the light, if they ever
do. Empirical studies related to this model probably would not come easy, but if somehow the
data allows for an identification of visibility, that variable should be included in the studies of
the effects of repression on mobilizations and uprisings. An option would be to do archival work
on past regimes, especially trying to find the activities of their secret agencies. Is it possible
that a new identification of this sort might in the future help to understand part of the recent
developments in the Middle East, for example? According to this model, an exogenous increase
in the precision in the information citizens receive about the real repressiveness of their regimes,
through the internet or social networks, might have influenced recent uprisings, such as the ones
occurred during the Arab Spring. On modelling the role of propaganda about the strength of the
regime, Edmond [2011] concluded that dictatorial regimes might actually benefit from increases
in the quality of information, as their distortion might be taken as more precise. Through a
different channel, based on the role of information about the repression profile of the regime, this
paper has the opposite prediction for most regimes.
Evidently, this is just a first approximation to the nature of the use of hidden repression by dic-
tatorial regimes. Future theoretical studies should also try to find what is the possible change in
these results in a dynamic setting, where there are multiple periods of time where the regime can
affect the visibility, and the citizens decide if they participate or not in the revolution. Another
possible extension of this model would try to identify the optimal function through which the
citizen incorporates all of the information available for her. In order to simplify the analysis, we
assumed in this paper that citizens take a linear function of both signals, but it could be that
the optimal function takes another, more complicated, form. This would require the use of either
numerical methods or functional analysis.
7Recall that through the methodology of Harsanyi [1967] and in particular through the structure of Global
Games as shown by Morris and Shin [2002a], the model considers implicitly the higher order beliefs of the agents,
without the need to model them explicitly. A complete description of the "type" of a player in an incomplete
information game suffice to incorporate a full hierarchy of higher order beliefs.
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Another possibility to further this research would be to investigate how these conclusions would
apply to repression under democratic political systems. Indeed, it is easier to justify the decision
making process in a dictatorship as modelled by one single utility function than it would be in
a democracy. Nonetheless, it is probable that a democracy adds some restrictions on the utility
function of the head of the government, but that it might still be feasible to model that scenario
similarly to this one. In any case, further research needs to be done to understand the proper
role of hidden repression in all political settings.
33
References
D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson. A theory of political transitions. American Economic Review,
pages 938–963, 2001.
D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson. Economic origins of democracy and dictatorship, 2006.
D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson. Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty.
Crown Business, 2012.
G. Angeletos, C. Hellwig, and A. Pavan. Signaling in a global game: Coordination and policy
traps. Journal of Political Economy, 114:452–484, 2006.
G.M. Angeletos, C. Hellwig, and A. Pavan. Dynamic global games of regime change: Learning,
multiplicity, and the timing of attacks. Econometrica, 75(3):711–756, 2007.
G. Becker. A note on restaurant pricing and other examples of social influences on price. Journal
of Political Economy, 99(5):1109, 1991.
H. Carlsson and E. Van Damme. Global games and equilibrium selection. Econometrica: Journal
of the Econometric Society, pages 989–1018, 1993.
Y. Chang, Z. Luo, and Y. Zhang. Revolution as rent seeking: The paradox of revolution and the
timing of third-party intervention. Technical report, Working paper, 2013.
C. Davenport. Repression and mobilization: Insights from political science and sociology. Re-
pression and mobilization, 2005.
C. Davenport. State repression and political order. Annual Review of Political Science, 10:1–23,
2007.
W. Easterly and S. Fischer. The soviet economic decline. The World Bank Economic Review, 9
(3):341–371, 1995.
C. Edmond. Information manipulation, coordination, and regime change. Technical report,
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011.
34
Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia. The Evolution of Secret Police Forces. Columbia University
Press, 2012.
S. Fischer. Russia and the soviet union then and now. In The Transition in Eastern Europe,
Volume 1, pages 221–258. University of Chicago Press, 1994.
J. Gandhi. Political institutions under dictatorship. Cambridge University Press New York, 2008.
J. Ginkel and A. Smith. So you say you want a revolution a game theoretic explanation of
revolution in repressive regimes. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43(3):291–316, 1999.
R. Goldstein. Political repression in modern America from 1870 to the present. University of
Illinois Press, 2001.
P. Gregory, P. Schröder, and K. Sonin. Dictators, repression and the median citizen:
An’eliminations model’of stalin’s terror (data from the nkvd archives). 2006.
C. Grinstead and James L. Snell. Introduction to probability. American Mathematical Soc., 1997.
J. Harsanyi. Games with incomplete information played by “bayesian” players, i-iii part i. the
basic model. Management science, 14(3):159–182, 1967.
P. Kurrild-Klitgaard. The paradox of rebellion. In The encyclopedia of public choice, pages
728–731. Springer, 2003.
S. Levitsky and L. Way. Competitive authoritarianism: hybrid regimes after the cold war. Cam-
bridge University Press, 2010.
M. Lichbach. Rethinking rationality and rebellion theories of collective action and problems of
collective dissent. Rationality and Society, 6(1):8–39, 1994.
W. Moore. Rational rebels: overcoming the free-rider problem. Political Research Quarterly, 48
(2):417–454, 1995.
S. Morris and H. Shin. Unique equilibrium in a model of self-fulfilling currency attacks. American
Economic Review, pages 587–597, 1998.
35
S. Morris and H. Shin. Global games: Theory and applications, advances in economic theory
and econometrics: Proceedings of the eighth world congress of the econometric society (m.
dewatripont, l. hansen, and s. turnovsky, eds.), 2002a.
S. Morris and H. Shin. Social value of public information. The American Economic Review, 92
(5):1521–1534, 2002b.
M. Olson. Collective action. The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 1:474–477, 1987.
T. Persson and G. Tabellini. Democratic capital: The nexus of political and economic change.
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 1(2):86–126, 2009.
J. Pierskalla. Protest, deterrence, and escalation: The strategic calculus of government repression.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54(1):117–145, 2010.
L. Shelley. Policing Soviet society: The evolution of state control. Routledge, 1995.
T. Skocpol. States and social revolutions, volume 29. Cambridge Univ Press, 1979.
M. Svolik. The politics of authoritarian rule. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
G. Tullock. The paradox of revolution. Public Choice, 11(1):89–99, 1971.
G. Tullock. The social dilemma: The economics of war and revolution. University publications
Blacksburg, VA, 1974.
G. Tullock. Autocracy. Springer, 1987a.
G. Tullock. The politics of bureaucracy. University Press of America New York, 1987b.
L. Way. The real causes of the color revolutions. Journal of Democracy, 19(3):55–69, 2008.
R. Wintrobe. The tinpot and the totalitarian: An economic theory of dictatorship. The American
Political Science Review, pages 849–872, 1990.
R. Wintrobe. The political economy of dictatorship, volume 6. Cambridge Univ Press, 1998.
36
Appendix A
A.1 Additional Figure
Figure 6: Optimal β for different regime types
A.2
Proof Proposition 2. Consider a following switching strategy x∗ s.t.
ai =

1 iff x ≤ x∗
0 iff x > x∗
Notice that as each citizen observes xi, his best guess about θ is precisely xi. Normalizing the
distribution we have that
√
α(xi−θ) ∼ N (0, 1). Assuming law of large numbers, we have that for
any realization of η, the proportion of agents who draw a signal below x∗ equals the probability
with which the agent herself draws a signal below x∗. This probability is then
Pr[x ≤ x∗ | θ] = Pr[θ + i ≤ x∗] = Pr
[
i
σx
≤ x
∗ − θ
σx
]
= Φ(
√
α(x∗ − θ))
37
so,
A(θ, x∗) = Φ(
√
α(x∗ − θ))
where Φ is the c.d.f. of a standard normal distribution. A(·) is decreasing in θ, so the regime is
overthrown if and only if θ < θ∗, where θ∗ is the unique solution to
A(θ∗, x∗) = θ∗
Let us first characterize the equilibrium condition θ∗ for a given x∗.
Φ(
√
α(x∗ − θ∗)) = θ∗
So, we get
x∗ = θ∗ +
1√
α
Φ−1(θ∗) (17)
Now, lets characterize the equilibrium x∗ for a given θ∗. Given that the regime is overthrown if
and only if θ ≤ θ∗, the expected payoff for the marginal agent is
E[U(a,A(θ, x∗), θ) | x, x∗] = a((b+ η)Pr[θ ≤ θ∗ | x, x∗]− c)
Given the signals the citizen receives, the posterior of the agent is
θ | x ∼ N (x, α−1)
where
Pr[θ ≤ θ∗ | x, x∗] = Φ(√α(θ∗ − x)) = 1− Φ(√α(x− θ∗))
which is decreasing in x. So, the agent attacks if and only if x ≤ x∗, where x∗ solves the
indifference condition
(b+ η)Pr[θ ≤ θ∗ | x∗] = c (18)
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where by replacing 17 in 18, we have
Φ−1(1− c
b+ η
) = Φ−1(θ∗)
so, finally
θ∗ = 1− c
b+ η
(19)
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